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I. INTRODUCTION
Shepard's Citations does not do justice to the Alaska Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Ravin v. State.1  Other state courts
consistently have rejected or ignored Ravin's central holding-that
adults enjoy a constitutional right to smoke marijuana in their homes.2
Indeed, that holding, like so many other artifacts of the 1970s, now
gives the impression of having been too much a product of its time.
3
Nevertheless, Ravin represents an early and ambitious attempt to
devise a method of constitutional analysis that denies independent
weight to "notions of morality."'4 This attempt, though only partly
successful, holds important lessons for courts that have come late to
the same view of morality's place in judicial review.'
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1. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
2. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Arii. 1977); Laird v. State, 342 So.2d
962, 963 (Fla. 1977); State v. Kincaid, 566 P.2d 763, 765 (Idaho 1977); NORML v. Scott, 383
N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (Ill. App. 1978); State v. Chrisman, 364 So.2d 906, 907 (La. 1978); Marcoux
v. Attorney Gen., 375 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Mass. 1978); State v. Kells, 259 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb.
1977); People v. Shepard, 409 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Anderson, 558 P.2d 307,
309 (Wash. App. 1976).
3. The Alaska courts have never overruled Ravin. In 1990, though, Alaskans voted by
popular referendum to re-criminalize the possession of marijuana. See Mowing the Grass (Alaska
Recriminalizes Possession of Marijuana), TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 47. The statute that is the
outgrowth of this referendum, ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060, has not been tested in Alaska's
appellate courts, probably because the Alaska Attorney General has declined to enforce it. The
statute was declared unconstitutional by an Alaska trial court judge in State v. McNeil, No.
IKE-93-947 (Alaska Dist. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993).
4. Ravin, 537 P.2dat 511.
5. These courts now include the Supreme Court. Last term, in Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003), the Court held: "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
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At the core of the Ravin decision lies the recognition that
"notions of morality, propriety, or fashion" cannot by themselves
justify the assertion of government control over the conduct of
individuals. The justices who joined the majority opinion in Ravin
expressed their personal opposition to the use of marijuana and other
"psychoactive drugs."6  And they said that this opposition was
grounded in their personal conviction that "the duty to live
responsibly, for our own sakes and for society's," could best be
fulfilled "without the use of psychoactive substances."7  However,
they concluded that these convictions fell within the realm of "notions
of morality, propriety, or fashion" and so could not justify Alaska's
statutory prohibition on use of marijuana.' The "authority of the state
to exert control over the individual," they said, extends only to
activities that have tangible adverse effects on the actor herself,9 other
individuals, or society at large.' 0
If Ravin's core principle seems banal, it was not when it was
announced. Eleven years after Ravin, the United States Supreme
Court would hold, in Bowers v. Hardwick, that "the presumed belief of
a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" provided an adequate justification for a
Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy." The Court said,
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice." Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
6. Ravin, 537 P.2dat 511.
7. Id. at 511-12.
8. Id. at 509.
9. Id. Ravin itself actually contains two inconsistent answers to the question whether harm
to the actor herself qualifies as cognizable harm. At one point, the court in Ravin expressed
support for "the general proposition that the authority of the state to exert control over the
individual extends only to activities of the individual which affect others or the public at large." Id.
(emphasis supplied). But the court in Ravin also relied on an alternative formulation of the right,
saying "[n]o one has an absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will
affect himself or others adversely." Id. at 504 (emphasis supplied). Three years after Ravin, in
State v. Erickson, the Alaska Supreme Court resolved the tension between these two
formulations. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). In concluding that the ingestion of cocaine was not
shielded by the right to privacy, the court assumed that harm to the actor herself could justify
state intervention. Id. at 22. In subsequent cases, the Alaska courts have continued consistently
to take the view that harm to the actor herself is cognizable harm. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 930
P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984); Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 95 (Alaska 2001). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1372-73 (2d ed. 1988) ("The intuition that one's safety is
wholly one's own business is simply too far out of phase with the reality of our interdependent
society to find any plausible expression in our constitutional order.").
10. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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"[t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under
the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.
12
Alaska courts have not been "very busy indeed" invalidating
criminal statutes, perhaps because most laws "representing essentially
moral choices" also are, not coincidentally, designed to prevent
individuals from inflicting tangible harm on themselves or others.13
But Ravin's effort to eliminate mere "notions of morality" from
judicial review-and its concomitant insistence upon evidence of
tangible harm to persons-has forced the Alaska Supreme Court, in
Ravin and in subsequent decisions, to explore the ill-defined
boundaries between private morality and the public welfare. Among
the insights borne of these efforts is the court's recognition in Ravin
that the possibility of indirect harm to "the fabric of our society" 4
might sometimes justify the assertion of government control over
individuals.
This recognition, as I will argue, reintroduces morality into
judicial review, albeit in a very different role than it played in, say,
Bowers v. Hardwick. The simple, habitual, moral reaction patterns
that ordinarily prevent human beings from injuring one another are
among the most important fibers in the "fabric of society." And
though, under Ravin, these reaction patterns have no legally
cognizable value in themselves, they have instrumental value insofar
as they prevent tangible harm to persons. Thus, society's interest in
preserving these reaction patterns could conceivably justify regulating
otherwise harmless conduct.
In this article, I will explore the possibility that harm to the
fabric of society provides the best justification for some statutes that
prohibit otherwise harmless conduct. After some preliminary remarks
about why the cognizability of harm is important, I will consider three
illustrations: first, the incest statutes, which, even in progressive states
like Alaska and New York, prohibit a wide array of basically harmless
conduct; second, a Massachusetts statute regulating the use of human
silhouettes in target practice; 5 and finally, legislation that would
prohibit the medical procedure known as "partial-birth abortion. '"6
12. Id. Compare Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125-26 (Mont. 1997) (laws prohibiting
consensual homosexual activity cannot be justified by reference to the government's desire "to
improve the morality of individuals").
13. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting constitutional challenge
to Alaska's statutory prohibition on assisted suicide); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to statute prohibiting use of cocaine).
14. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509.
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(a).
16. H.R. 4965, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
2003]
Seattle University Law Review
After discussing these illustrations, I will undertake a close analysis of
the general argument for the preservation of moral reaction patterns.
Though I will conclude that the argument generally is valid, I will not
offer any opinion as to whether, with respect to any particular statute,
the argument ought to carry the day. The ultimate validity of the laws
in question, particularly the ban on partial-birth abortions, involves
considerations well beyond the scope of this article.
II. WHY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COGNIZABILITY OF HARM ARE
IMPORTANT
Questions about the cognizability of harm play two separate roles
in constitutional privacy analysis. First, and most obviously, these
questions figure in the determination of whether, in a particular
instance, government intrusion upon a constitutionally protected
activity is justified by a substantial or compelling government interest.
In this setting, questions about the cognizability of harm succeed the
identification of the constitutionally protected sphere of conduct.
This was the case, for example, in Powell v. State, 7 where the Georgia
Supreme Court struck down the very sodomy statute that had been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court twelve years before in
Bowers v. Hardwick."s Only after determining that sodomy "falls
within the area protected by the right to privacy"' 9 did the Georgia
court undertake to determine whether the government interests
asserted by the Georgia Attorney General, including the "furtherance
of social morality," were legally cognizable.2" They were not.2
But questions about the cognizability of harm also play a second,
less obvious role in constitutional privacy analysis, at least in Alaska.
From Ravin onward, Alaska's courts have frequently acknowledged
that the potential consequences of a particular activity determine in
part whether society is prepared to recognize it as "private" in the first
place. As the court said in Ravin, "one aspect of a private matter is
that it is private, that is, that it does not adversely affect persons
17. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
18. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
19. Powell, 51 S.E.2d at 24.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 26. Questions about the cognizability of harm play this role in Alaska's courts
too. In Alaska, the determination that a particular activity is protected by the right to privacy
triggers the application of one of several balancing tests. Depending upon the importance of the
privacy right at stake, the Alaska courts may require only a "close and substantial relationship"
between the public welfare and the intrusion upon privacy, Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511, or,
alternatively, may require that the challenged regulation advance a "compelling state interest" by
the "least restrictive" possible means, Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 84 (1980). See generally
Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 971 n.17 (Alaska 1997).
[Vol. 27:41
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beyond the actor, and hence is none of their business.- 22 Under this
approach, the fact that, say, sodomy does not inflict cognizable harm
on the actor or others is an important factor in the threshold
determination that it is "private."
This pragmatic, effects-focused approach to privacy analysis was
applied, for example, in Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, where
the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a municipal ordinance regulating
massage parlors.23 In Hilbers, the court said an activity qualifies as
private only if an individual's subjective expectation of privacy in the
activity is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
24
Whether an expectation of privacy qualifies as "reasonable" depends,
of course, on the costs and benefits of treating the activity as private.25
This approach to privacy was summarized in Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling, Inc., where the Alaska Supreme Court explained that the
"boundaries" of the right to privacy cannot be defined without resort
to balancing of interests:
[T]here is a sphere of activity in every person's life that is closed
to scrutiny by others. The boundaries of that sphere are
determined by balancing a person's right to privacy against
other public policies, such as 'the health, safety, rights and
privileges of others. 
26
The Alaska courts' reliance on effects analysis in defining a
protected sphere of private activity is justified, in part, by the
inadequacy of the alternatives. Though historical analysis has an
important role to play in privacy analysis,27 heavy reliance on historical
analysis would be inconsistent with the Alaska courts' flexible
approach to constitutional interpretation, which is based on the
assumption that "what was practical historically is not necessarily
adequate to the needs of our times. "28 The other noteworthy
22. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504 (emphasis in original).
23. Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 42 (Alaska 1980).
24. Id. at 42 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
25. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 880 (Alaska 1979) (standard requires court to balance
"the often competing interests of society and the individual").
2'Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135-36 (Alaska 1989) (quoting
Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504). See also Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1981) (discussing
right to privacy: "[in effect, there must be here a balancing of conflicting rights and interests").
27. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2001); Friedman v. District
Court, 611 P.2d 77, 78 (Alaska 1980).
28. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 396 (Alaska 1970). Exclusive reliance on
historical analysis might, for example, lead to the vindication of criminal laws forbidding
homosexual sodomy. Historical analysis formed the principle basis for the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192-94:
2003]
Seattle University Law Review
alternative to balancing is a kind of navel-gazing conceptual reasoning,
wherein one considers whether the activity seems "intimate" or
"personal." But, as Professor Cass Sunstein has pointed out, "[tlerms
such as 'intimate' and 'personal' provide little help. They tend to be
conclusions masquerading as analytic devices. '29  Thankfully, the
Alaska courts rarely seem to have concerned themselves with whether
a particular activity seems "personal" or "intimate." Instead, in
attempting to differentiate private conduct from non-private conduct,
the courts have focused on the likely effects of foreclosing government
regulation of the activity.
It is the necessity of balancing-both in defining what is "private"
and in judging the legitimacy of government intrusion on this private
sphere-that makes the cognizability of harm so important. The mere
requirement of balancing is, in itself, relatively free of content; if the
right to privacy consisted only of a balancing requirement, then
implementation of the right to privacy would nearly place the courts in
the position of a super-legislature, albeit a super-legislature that was
required to accord substantial deference to factual conclusions of the
legislature itself. The various balancing tests articulated by the courts
supply only the structure of the right to privacy. The right's content is
supplied in large measure by limitations on the forms of harm that
qualify as counterweights to individual autonomy.3"
III. HARM AND THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY
Though Ravin suggests that harm to the social fabric sometimes
will justify government intervention, the decision itself does not
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy
laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the
District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in
private and between consenting adults.
29. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 88 (1999) (addressing question of assisted suicide).
30. Limitations on the cognizability of harm also form the core of First Amendment
analysis, though here too courts often are distracted by the task of identifying and applying the
appropriate balancing test. Specifically, the core of First Amendment jurisprudence is the
principal that, except in a few very narrow circumstances, a government cannot justify laws
restricting speech by reference to harm arising from the communicative impact of the activity. A
recent illustration of this principle can be found in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 53S U.S.
234, 253 (2001), where the Supreme Court held that a statutory prohibition on virtual child-
pornography could not be justified by concerns that the pornography would "whet the appetites"
of potential pedophiles. See also TRIBE, supra note 9, at 790 ("if the constitutional guarantee [of
free speech] is not to be trivialized, it must mean that government cannot justify restrictions on
free expression by reference to the adverse consequences of allowing certain ideas or information
to enter the realm of discussion and awareness").
[Vol. 27:41
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elaborate on this suggestion at any length."a  The decision
acknowledges that "the authority of the state to control the activities of
its citizens is not limited to activities which have a present and
immediate impact on the public health or welfare. '3 2  Then it
acknowledges that the possibility of harm to "the fabric of society"
might, in some instances, justify the state's efforts to control the
activities of its citizens:
It is conceivable, for example, that a drug could so seriously
develop in its user a withdrawal or amotivational syndrome, that
widespread use of the drug could significantly debilitate the
fabric of our society. Faced with a substantial possibility of such
a result, the state could take measures to combat the possibility.
The state is under no obligation to allow otherwise 'private'
activity which will result in numbers of people becoming public
charges or otherwise burdening the public welfare.1
3
This passage analyzes just one particular form of harm to the
social fabric: deterioration in motivation or industriousness (or, one
could say, in the "work ethic") among members of a particular group.
Of course, the passage is introduced by the words "for example," and
it makes sense to assume that deterioration in motivation or
industriousness is but one of many forms that cognizable harm to the
social fabric might take. After all, the possibility of drug users
burdening the public is a relatively indirect, and relatively
undisturbing, form of harm. By comparison, a debilitation of the
social fabric that somehow led to the infliction of physical harm on
others would be far more troubling, and far more deserving of
legislative intervention.
Thus, in Ravin itself the court took pains to emphasize that the
use of marijuana would not lead to the infliction of physical harm on
others, citing evidence "that marijuana inhibits 'the expression of
aggressive impulses by pacifying the user, interfering with muscle
coordination, reducing psychomotor activities and generally producing
states of drowsiness, lethargy, timidity and passivity."'3 4 The court
31. Though Ravir has been the subject of a good deal of comment, the comment generally
has focused on other aspects of the decision; none of the commentators has attempted to
elaborate on the "social fabric" rationale. See, e.g., Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the "Last
Frontier," Professor Gardner: Alaska's Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation,
12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1995); Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and
Personal Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1998);
Andrew Winters, Note, Ravin Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess
Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes? 15 ALASKA L. REV. 315 (1998).
32. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509 (Alaska 1975).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 507.
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assumed that marijuana might be subject to regulation if, somehow, it
made the user more likely to inflict harm on others. The same
assumption formed one part of the basis for the Alaska Court of
Appeals' decision upholding Alaska's "local option" law, which grants
municipal governments the option of regulating the distribution and
importation of alcoholic beverages." The Court of Appeals relied on
the fact that alcoholic beverages indirectly contribute to crime and
family violence-tangible harms to other persons.36
In what follows, I will argue that one aspect of the "fabric of
society" is various moral reaction patterns that inhibit conduct that is
itself harmful to other persons. And I will argue that state control of
otherwise private-and otherwise harmless-activities sometimes is
justified for the sake of preserving these reaction patterns. I will begin
this argument by analyzing incest statutes from Alaska and elsewhere.
IV. THE INCEST STATUTES
Alaska's incest statute, which was adopted three years after
Ravin as part of a major criminal code revision,37 provides that:
[a] person commits the crime of incest if, being 18 years of age
or older, that person engages in sexual penetration with another
who is related, either legitimately or illegitimately, as (1) an
ancestor or descendant of the whole or half blood; (2) a brother
or sister of the whole or half blood; or (3) an uncle, aunt,
nephew, or niece by blood.
3 8
Like many other incest statutes,39 Alaska's statute lacks any
prohibition on sexual intercourse among persons who are related by
adoption or marriage.4" Thus, a stepparent who engages in sexual
intercourse with his or her stepchild is not guilty of incest under the
statute, nor is an adoptive parent who engages in intercourse with the
adopted child.
Statutes prohibiting incest generally are thought to be justified
either (1) by the danger that children borne of intercourse among
immediate relatives will inherit genetic defects,4" or (2) by the danger
35. Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
36. Id. at 338.
37. 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166, § 3.
38. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.450. Incest is a class C felony, § 11.41.450(b), punishable by
up to five years' imprisonment, § 12.55.125(e).
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2, cmt. at 401 (1985) (in most states, "adopted
children were not included within the reach of incest laws").
40. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.450.
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2, cmt. at 402-05. There appears to be some question
whether this "eugenics" rationale for incest statutes is even legitimate. See Commonwealth v.
[Vol. 27:41
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that intercourse among immediate relatives will involve sexual
imposition by an adult upon a child.42 From the Alaska statute's
exclusive focus on sexual relations among blood relatives, it may be
inferred that the Alaska Legislature was principally concerned with
the first problem. The problem of sexual imposition was addressed by
the legislature separately, in the revised code's sexual abuse statutes,
whose various classifications were designed to reflect the heightened
danger of sexual imposition that exists when the offender and victim
are members of the same household.43 Thus, in Harmon v. State,
where a defendant argued that his convictions for both incest and
sexual abuse of a minor amounted to double jeopardy, the Alaska
Court of Appeals concluded that the incest statute and the sexual
abuse statute were designed to advance different societal interests. 4
But if indeed Alaska's incest statute was designed exclusively to
prevent the birth of children with genetic defects, the statute is vastly
overbroad. The statute broadly prohibits "sexual penetration," even
though three forms of conduct classified by statute as "sexual
penetration"-cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse-involve very
little danger of procreation.4" Further, the statute does not
differentiate heterosexual sex from homosexual sex, which involves no
danger whatever of procreation. 46  Finally, the statute contains no
exception for sexual intercourse by or with a person who is infertile.47
Nor is Alaska's incest statute at all unusual in this respect. New
York's incest statute, for example, prohibits sexual relations with an
ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either whole or half blood,
uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece." The statute does not reach sex with
persons who are relatives by adoption or marriage. 49 But it does reach
both sexual intercourse and "deviate sexual intercourse," which is
Smith, 728 N.E.2d 272, 277 (Mass. 2000) (characterizing "eugenics rationale" for incest statute
as "debatable"). It seems unlikely that the government would be justified generally in
prohibiting sexual intercourse among persons whom it deems to be genetically incompatible.
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2, cmt. at 407.
43. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434, 11.41.436, 11.41.438. Under § 11.41.434, for
example, an adult male who engages in sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old girl is guilty of
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor if he is "the victim's natural parent, stepparent, adopted
parent, or legal guardian." If instead the girl is a stranger to him, his conduct is not a crime at
all.
44. Harmon v. State, 11 P.3d 393, 395 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
45. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(58) (defining "sexual penetration" as "genital
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or an intrusion, however slight, of an object or
any part of a person's body into the genital or anal opening of another person's body").
46. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.450.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25.
49. Matter of Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Family Ct. Kings Co.
1981).
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defined to include both anal and oral intercourse." What is more, this
seeming anomaly-the inclusion of "deviate sexual intercourse" within
the scope of a statute apparently intended to prevent inbreeding-
cannot be attributed to mere carelessness. As originally adopted in
1965, New York's incest statute prohibited only vaginal intercourse.5 '
The New York State Legislature amended the statute in 1984 to
include "deviate sexual intercourse" within its prohibitions." 2
These statutes' breadth cannot be justified (as statutory breadth
often is) by "practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both
general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and
sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of
conduct are prohibited."" This is not a case where it would be
impossible, or even difficult, to draft a workable rule that would make
an exception for cases where the activity was harmless. The drafter
merely would, in the case of Alaska's statute, substitute the word
"intercourse" for "penetration" and would create exceptions for cases
where both actors were of the same sex and cases where one or both
was infertile. Nor would this amended statute be substantially more
difficult to enforce than the existing statute. This is not a case, in
other words, where it would be impossible for juries to differentiate
cases within the exceptions from cases outside the exceptions.
5 4
Neither, of course, is it an answer simply to assert that incest is
immoral. This is the very gambit that is rightly foreclosed by Ravin.5"
The mere fact that a majority of Alaskans consider incest immoral
does not differentiate incest from, say, homosexuality. 6  Indeed, in
50. N.Y. PENAL § 255.25; § 130.00(2) (defining "deviate sexual intercourse").
51. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 1030.
52. 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 649, § 1.
53. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
54. Concerns about notice and enforceability provide the explanation for much of the
generality in criminal statutes. It is trivially true that most criminal statutes command adherence
to general rules, rather than commanding just that persons refrain from conduct whose costs
outweigh-or grossly outweigh-its benefits. It is no defense to murder that society, in the long
run, will be much better off without the victim. Nor is it a defense to bribery that the bribe
secured the enactment of a law that will be overwhelmingly beneficial to society. Nor, finally, is
it a defense to perjury that the perjury was necessary to secure the acquittal of a defendant who,
though guilty, would contribute greatly to society if he remained free. The generality of these
rules need not be justified by resort to underlying moral reaction patterns. They can be justified
by the fact that murder, bribery, and perjury nearly always are harmful, rather than beneficial,
and the fact that it would be impossible to create a workable exception that would identify just
those cases where the conduct was beneficial to society in the long run.
55. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509.
56. In 1998, Alaskans voted overwhelmingly to adopt a constitutional amendment
providing that "a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman." ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 25. See also Liz Ruskin, Gay Marriage Ban Approved, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov.
4, 1998, at Al. The amendment was passed in response to a decision by an Alaska Superior
Court judge holding that each person has a fundamental right to choose his or her life partner,
[Vol. 27:41
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Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court's refusal to invalidate
Georgia's criminal sodomy statute was based in part on a concern that
doing so would set the Court on a slippery slope that would lead to,
among other things, the invalidation of laws forbidding incest:
And if respondent's submission is limited to the voluntary
sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult,
except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct
while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other
sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home. We
are unwilling to start down that road. 7
What, then, can be the justification for broadly prohibiting
incest? The best answer, I think, lies in the social utility of the
traditional aversion to incest. But for the existence of this aversion,
sexual abuse of young girls by their biological fathers would be more
common than it is. The traditional aversion to incest is deeply rooted
and durable, and so prevents abuse that would not be prevented by
the independent moral and legal proscription of sexual imposition.
Thus, society is better off trying to preserve this traditional aversion-
whatever its shortcomings-than in trying to replace it with a narrower,
more enlightened aversion to the production of genetically defective
offspring. After all, an aversion to the production of defective
offspring would not prevent fathers from engaging in oral or anal
intercourse with their daughters. Further, it is anyone's guess whether
the government would be successful in inculcating in its citizens a
truly visceral aversion to the production of genetically defective
offspring. No one can be encouraged by government's rather limited
success in inculcating in adult males an aversion to sexual imposition
upon unrelated teenage girls. 8
This argument ought to have some intuitive appeal, given the
tremendous costs of sexual abuse. Most of us would agree, I think,
that a narrowing of the incest statute could not possibly be worthwhile
if it resulted in even a few more girls being deprived of their
whatever the partner's sex. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Case No. 3AN-95-6562 CI,
1998 WL 88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
57. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003); see also Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority's decision eventually would lead to the invalidation of laws forbidding incest).
58. This sort of argument could not be used to justify a law that was designed to preserve
an aversion to homosexuality, any more than it could be used to justify a law designed to
cultivate, say, an aversion to sexual relations with brown-eyed persons. Society's interest in
preventing sexual imposition would not be served by just any random aversion that narrows the
universe of sexual partners. The utility of the aversion to incest arises from the fact that it is
finely-tuned to prevent sexual imposition in just those situations where proximity and
availability makes the danger of sexual imposition the greatest.
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childhoods.5 9 This argument also ought to evoke skepticism in any
reader who shares my liberal convictions; for we have already
acknowledged that among the acts prohibited by the incest statute is
an identifiable class of acts that are not themselves harmful.
Moreover, we have acknowledged that it would be practicable to draft
a statute that excludes these acts from the scope of the prohibition,
and that it would also be practicable to enforce such a narrower
prohibition. It makes sense to wonder, then, whether the general form
of this argument somehow is illegitimate. Before addressing this
question, we first will consider two illustrations that are more specific:
a Massachusetts target-shooting regulation and legislation regulating
partial-birth abortion.
V. TARGET-SHOOTING AND SOME RELATED PROBLEMS
Most of us share a broad aversion to physical violence that is as
strong and deeply rooted as the aversion to incest. This aversion often
is obscured in our daily lives, perhaps because we rarely confront
extreme physical suffering directly, or perhaps because our perception
of suffering often is affected by emotions like anger (at, say, a wartime
enemy). But where we confront extreme physical suffering without
the comfort of distance or anger, the experience of the visceral aversion
to violence can be overwhelming. Think back to those occasions when
you have confronted an injured animal; say, a dog that has been run-
over and that is struggling to regain its feet, or a goose that is trying to
fly despite a broken neck.6"
The preservation of the aversion to physical violence supplies the
best justification for a law very recently challenged in Gun Owners'
Action League v. Swift.61 The Massachusetts statute at issue in Gun
Owners regulated target-shooting at Class A licensed gun clubs by
prohibiting "shooting at targets that depict human figures, human
effigies, human silhouettes or any human images thereof, except by
59. This reckoning of the costs of child abuse is Nabokov's. See VLADIMIR NABOKOV,
LOLITA 283 (Vintage Books 1989) ("Unless it can be proven to me-to me as I am now, today,
with my heart and my beard, and my putrefaction-that in the infinite run it does not matter a
jot that a North American girl-child named Dolores Haze had been deprived of her childhood by
a maniac, unless this can be proven (and if it can, then life is a joke), I see nothing for the
treatment of my misery but the melancholy and very local palliative of articulate art.").
60. In using animal examples to refine this aversion to its essence, I am following ethologist
Konrad Lorenz. See KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 208 (transl. Latzke 1966) ("No sane
man would even go rabbit-hunting for pleasure if the necessity of killing his prey with his natural
weapons [i.e., his hands] brought home to him the full emotional realization of what he is
actually doing.").
61. Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123
S.Ct. 121 (2002).
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public safety personnel performing in line with their official duties."62
The Gun Owners Action League, among others, challenged the
constitutionality of this prohibition. It argued that shooting at human
silhouettes is expressive conduct entitled to first amendment
protection.
63
The First Circuit upheld that law without resolving the question
whether target-shooting is expressive conduct entitled to first
amendment protection. The court held that, assuming the law
affected protected expression, it still was content-neutral-the law
applied equally to persons who would shoot at pictures of tyrants and
those who would "shoot at images of advocates of freedom."64
Because it was content-neutral, the law would pass constitutional
muster so long as it was "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest."6 The court held that the law "does serve a
significant government interest," namely "to stop target practice that
arguably increases the practitioner's capacity to shoot human
beings."66
By "capacity to shoot human beings," the First Circuit meant
"proficiency" or "skill" in shooting at human beings, rather than the
moral capacity to shoot at human beings. The court said: "A person
who has practiced shooting at a human-shaped target will likely be
more proficient at shooting humans than a person who has had to
practice at a circular target. '"67 But the difference for constitutional
purposes is slight. Whether one views proficiency or cold-
bloodedness as the principal concern, the rationale for the statute is
basically the same: the act is prohibited because it is thought to
produce a particular condition in the actor, which would, in turn,
make the actor more dangerous.
What is more, the moral capacity argument better reflects the
actual purpose of the statute. The Massachusetts Legislature almost
certainly did not hope merely that persons who were denied an
opportunity to shoot at human images would be more likely to miss
when shooting at real human beings. Instead, the legislature probably
hoped that persons who were denied an opportunity to shoot at human
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(a).
63. Gun Owner's Action League, 284 F.3d at 210 ("One plaintiff, Outdoor Message, Inc.,
distributes a target with the image of Adolph Hitler on its front, and an account of Hitler's
restrictions on firearm use on the back. Those who buy the target shoot at the image of Hitler in
order to express their opposition to tyranny and restrictions on gun use, and other political
messages.").
64. Id.at2ll.
65. Id. at 211 - 12.
66. Id. at 211, 212.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
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images would be less likely to shoot at human beings in the first
instance. This is not an unreasonable hope. Most of us would find it
difficult to shoot a gun at a human being.68 Shooting at a human
image might dull this aversion.
Arguments based on the social utility of the moral aversion to
physical violence are not unprecedented. In 1981, for example, the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts relied on roughly this rationale in
upholding a statute that prohibited cruelty to animals.69 The court
concluded that the statute was justified to preserve the "humanitarian"
aversion to violence, stating "[t]hese statutes are 'directed against acts
which may be thought to have a tendency to dull humanitarian
feelings and to corrupt the morals of those who observe or have
knowledge of those acts. "'7' The Utah Supreme Court adopted a
similar rationale in rejecting a constitutional challenge to Utah's
animal cruelty statute:
Whatever one's personal views may be of such matters, the
legislative authority of our state has determined as a matter of
public policy that such conduct is so involved in public morals
and welfare that it has made cruelty to animals a crime and
included therein the causing of one animal to fight with
another .... [W]e are in agreement with the expression of
respected authorities that legislation against such practices as the
fighting of animals is justified for the purpose of regulating
morals and promoting the good order and general welfare of
society.7'
If these courts can be faulted for refusing to assign any legal
weight to the interests of the animals themselves-and I think they
68. In Max Frisch's I'M NOT STILLER, the narrator and protagonist (who concededly is
very unreliable) offers this explanation of his (Stiller's) failure to shoot at approaching Fascist
soldiers:
He hated the Fascists, otherwise he wouldn't have volunteered to fight in the Spanish
Civil War; but that early morning on the Tajo, when Stiller first came face to face
with the hated foe, he saw the four Fascists as human beings, and he found it
impossible to shoot at human beings, he couldn't do it. That was all.
MAX FRISCH, I'M NOT STILLER 123 (transl. Bullock 1958).
69. Knox v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 425 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1981).
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978) (footnotes omitted). See also West
Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613, 615 (UtahCt. App. 1993) (quoting same); Ill. Gamefowl
Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 389 N.E.2d 529, 532-33 (Il1. 1979) (state law prohibiting activities
related to sport of animal fighting is a valid exercise of state's police power to protect and
promote the general welfare of its citizens); People v. Reed, 176 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103, 122 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 10, 36 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1981) (law prohibiting neglect of animals is a
valid exercise of state's police power).
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can-they cannot be faulted for perceiving a connection between cruelty
to animals and violence toward human beings. Recent studies have
demonstrated a correlation between cruelty to animals and domestic
violence.72 Thus, it is not unreasonable to suppose, as these courts
apparently did, that participation in cruelty to animals dulls the
ordinary human aversion to violence, and that the dulling of this
aversion makes an individual more dangerous to other human beings.
A similar-and, I would argue, related-argument formed one part
of the United States Supreme Court's rationale for upholding
Washington State's prohibition on physician-assisted suicide in
Washington v. Glucksberg.73 The Court said that the prohibition was
justified in part by the state's "interest in protecting the integrity and
ethics of the medical profession." 4  The Court also quoted the
American Medical Association's Code of Ethics for the proposition
that "[p]hysician assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with
the physician's role as healer.""5 This is a powerful point, which is
independent of other rationales for upholding the ban on assisted
suicide. Even if one otherwise were inclined to conclude that
physician-assisted suicide sometimes is justified, one still would be
right to distrust a physician who could bring herself to kill her
patients. The physician's actions, though legal and though perhaps
even justified from a strictly utilitarian perspective, would dull her
respect for human life.76 This acquired ruthlessness would, in turn,
make her dangerous to her patients.77
72. See F. R. Ascione, The Abuse of Animals and Domestic Violence: A National Survey of
Shelters for Women Who Are Battered, 5 SOCIETY AND ANIMALS 205-218 (1997); E. DeViney, J.
Dickert & R. Lockwood, The Care of Pets Within Child Abusing Families, 4 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANIMAL PROBLEMS 321-29 (1983).
73. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
74. Id. at 731; see also Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 103 (Fla. 1997) (upholding
Florida's statutory prohibition on physician assisted suicide; relying in part on state's
"compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession").
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 (quoting American Medical Association, Code of Ethics §
2.211 (1994)); see also NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 105 - 07 (1994).
76. See JOHN KEOWN, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 261-96 (John
Keown ed., 1995).
77. This is one of those situations where, as utilitarian philosopher J.C.C. Smart has said,
"we should probably dislike and fear a man who could bring himself to do the right utilitarian
act ... Though the man in this case might have done the right utilitarian act, his act would
betoken a toughness and lack of squeamishness which would make him a dangerous person."
J.J.C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 71 (1973).
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Yet another related example is found in laws prohibiting the
mistreatment of human corpses. 7' These laws generally prohibit any
mistreatment of a corpse, regardless of whether the mistreatment
affects the interests of any living relative and regardless even of
whether the misconduct contravenes the wishes of the deceased.79
Thus, mistreatment of a corpse is an offense not against the deceased
or the deceased relatives but against the "public order."8  Statutes
prohibiting misconduct against a corpse are designed to express-and, I
would suggest, to preserve-society's sense of revulsion at the
undignified treatment of what was once a person. This revulsion is
part and parcel of a broader moral reaction pattern that makes us
averse to the mistreatment of other human beings, living or dead.81
This broader reaction pattern has tremendous social utility.
The process whereby the criminal law reinforces moral reaction
patterns sometimes is multifaceted and mysterious. But, in these
examples, at least one facet of the process is relatively mundane.
What binds together the forgoing examples-laws prohibiting shooting
at human silhouettes, cruelty to animals, physician-assisted suicide,
and the mistreatment of corpses-is the fact that each form of conduct
resembles the infliction of very tangible harm on other persons. It is an
axiom of psychotherapeutic practice that a person may gradually be
78. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.130. Prosecutions for mistreatment of a corpse are
relatively rare. One recent example occurred in Cincinnati, where a professional photographer
was prosecuted for "abuse of a corpse" after using corpses in "an artistic series intended to
portray the cycle of life and death." Stephen Kinzer, In Cincinnati, Art Bows to the Privacy of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at B7.
79. Laws prohibiting the mistreatment of corpses "do not increase the rights of kindred in
the dead bodies of their relatives." 22A AM. JUR. 2d Dead Bodies § 4 (1988). Rather, they are
said to "have as their objective the protection of the rights of the public." Id. See generally State
v. Hartzler, 433 P.2d 231, 234-35 (N.M. App. 1967) (reviewing common-law origins of crime of
indecent handling of dead body before upholding conviction for it).
80. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.130 is included in Chapter 11.61, which is entitled "Offenses
Against Public Order."
81. Probably the best evidence for the close relationship between respect for the living and
respect for the dead is found in the persistence through history of human beings' revulsion
toward the mistreatment of corpses. The Greek historian Herodotus remarked on the diversity
of the methods by which societies express respect for their dead. But he also remarked on the
uniformity and depth of the societies' revulsion toward any failure to comply with their specific
method of expressing respect for the dead:
Darius, during his own rule, called together some of the Greeks who were in
attendance on him and asked them what would they take to eat their dead fathers.
They said that no price in the world would make them do so. After that Darius
summoned those of the Indians who are called Callatians, who do eat their parents,
and , in the presence of the Greeks (who understood the conversation through an
interpreter), asked them what price would make them burn their dead fathers with
fire. They shouted aloud, 'Don't mention such horrors!'
Herodotus, Histories (Book III) HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY 228 (David Grene trans.,
The University of Chicago Press 1987) (emphasis in original).
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"desensitized" to her aversions by engaging in conduct that resembles
the conduct to which she is averse.82 Thus, a person who is afraid of
spiders might gradually be desensitized by being exposed in sequence
to pictures of spiders, then rubber spiders, and finally real spiders.83
Just so, a soldier who is averse to shooting other persons might be
desensitized by shooting at human silhouettes or human effigies. If
the criminal law can prevent or deter persons from taking the first,
seemingly harmless step toward desensitization, it may ultimately
prevent the deterioration of moral reaction patterns upon which
society depends.
VI. A HARDER CASE: PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION
A final-and far more controversial-example of a law that
arguably is justified by the need to preserve human beings' habitual
aversion to physical violence is found in recent legislative efforts to
regulate the location of fetal demise in abortion practice. The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down
Kansas's prohibition on the procedure known as "partial-birth
abortion," did not resolve the core question posed by such statutes:
whether it ever makes sense to regulate abortion on the basis of the
fetus's location at the time of its death.84 This question has not -gone
away, for Congress and several state legislatures have undertaken,
with varying degrees of good faith, to fix the defects identified by the
Supreme Court in Carhart.8" It seems likely that the courts will be
required eventually to address a statute that lacks the defects of the
first generation of partial-birth bans, and whose constitutional validity
can be determined only by evaluating its justification in policy.
The controversy over partial-birth abortion began in 1992, when
Dr. Martin Haskell presented a monograph entitled "Dilation and
Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortion" at a risk management
seminar conducted by the National Abortion Federation.86 In this
monograph, Dr. Haskell said he had developed "an alternative method
82. See, e.g., MANI FENIGER, JOURNEY FROM ANXIETY TO FREEDOM 131-58 (1997);
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, COMPLETE HOME MEDICAL GUIDE 969 (1999).
83. See HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL FAMILY HEALTH GUIDE, supra note 82, at 406.
84. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
85. See Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2002, H.R. 4965, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002);
William Glaberson, Foes of Abortion Start New Effort After Court Loss, N.Y, TIMES, June 30,
2000, at Al; Virginia Senate Passes Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS, Feb.
20, 2003, at http://www.cwnews.com (last visited June 30, 2003).
86. The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1833 before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (November 17, 1995) (hereinafter "1995 Senate
Hearing") at 3, 5 (Haskell monograph).
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for achieving late second trimester abortions."87 As described by Dr.
Haskell, this method, which he referred to as "Dilation and
Extraction," or "D & X," involves several steps."8  First, the patient's
cervical opening is enlarged over the course of several days through
the insertion of progressively larger cervical dilators.8 9 During the
operation itself, the surgeon first uses forceps to grasp one of the
fetus's "lower extremities," that is, one of the fetus's legs, and then
pulls the leg into the vagina.9" Next, "the surgeon uses his fingers to
deliver the opposite lower extremity, then the torso, the shoulders, and
the upper extremities."' The fetus's head, which is too large to pass
through the cervical opening, lodges inside the cervix. At this point,
only the fetus's head is inside the patient; the fetus's body, which "is
oriented dorsum or spine up," is outside the mother and is visible to
the doctor.92 After grasping the fetus by the shoulders and "push[ing]
the anterior cervical lip out of the way,"" the doctor inserts the tip of a
pair of scissors into the base of the fetus's skull, then "spreads the
scissors to enlarge the opening."" The doctor removes the scissors
and inserts a suction catheter in their place, then sucks out the fetus's
brain, thereby killing the fetus.9" Once the brain has been removed,
the fetus's head no longer is too large to pass through the cervical
opening. The doctor completes the delivery.
What distinguished Dr. Haskell's method from traditional
methods of abortion was that, in his procedure, partial delivery of the
fetus preceded the killing of the fetus. Traditional methods of
abortion had involved killing the fetus inside the uterus, by means of
chemicals, dismemberment, or the severing of the umbilical cord. 96
Thus, in traditional methods of abortion, the killing of the fetus had
taken place out of sight. For Congress, the killing of a fetus that was
partly or mostly outside the mother bore a troubling resemblance to
infanticide, particularly when the fetus was viable or nearly So.97 It
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also 1995 Senate Hearing at 18 (testimony of Brenda Pratt Shafer, R.N.).
93. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 86, at 8 (Haskell monograph).
94. Id. at 9.
95. Dr. Haskell's monograph contains no reference to the death of the fetus. But during a
1993 interview with the American Medical News, Dr. Haskell acknowledged that two thirds of
the fetuses are not dead when he begins to remove them from the mother. 1995 Senate Hearing,
supra note 86, at 23 (letter from Barbara Bolsen, editor of American Medical News).
96. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 86, at 6 (Haskell monograph).
97. The reason for Congress's concern is apparent in the testimony of the first witness to
testify in the 1995 Senate Hearing. Brenda Pratt Shafer, a registered nurse who had witnessed
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was this wrong to which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995
and its state counterparts were addressed.
Though much of the litigation over partial-birth abortion
focused on the supposed98 vagueness of the statutory language and the
narrowness of the statutory exception for procedures necessary to
preserve the mother's health, some courts also raised questions that
went to the core of the statutes' rationale. In Planned Parenthood v.
Doyle, Judge Richard Posner argued that the state could have no
legitimate interest in regulating abortions on the basis of the location
of the fetus.99 That is, Judge Posner argued that the state could have
no legitimate interest in requiring the physician to kill the fetus in the
uterus rather than in the "birth canal":
If the state is right that there is always an equally safe alternative
form of abortion to partial birth abortion, then the statute cannot
discourage abortions-cannot save any fetuses-but can merely
shift their locus from the birth canal to the uterus. What
interest has the state in such a shift?'00
Judge Posner also pointed out that there is no basis for assuming that
"if a fetus feels pain, the pain is worse when the fetus is killed in the
birth canal than when death occurs a moment earlier in the womb.' ' 1
As a preliminary matter, Judge Posner's reference to the "birth
canal" is euphemistic and somewhat misleading. In the procedure
described by Dr. Haskell, only the fetus's head remains inside its
mother; the rest of the fetus, including its shoulders and arms, is
outside the mother, on the operating table.0 2 But this point alone
obviously is not a complete answer to Judge Posner, because Judge
Posner's argument is forceful even as applied to a fetus located mostly
outside its mother; it is difficult to see "[w]hat interest the state has"
in shifting the locus of the abortion from the operating table to the
womb.
Judge Posner is not alone in arguing that the location of the fetus
should not make a difference. Philosopher Peter Singer, for example,
the procedure during her employment at Dr. Haskell's clinic, testified that during the procedure
everything but the fetus's head was visible. "The baby's little fingers were clasping and
unclasping, and his little feet were kicking." One of the procedures she had witnessed involved a
fetus at 26 weeks' development. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 86, at 18.
98. See Case Comment, Sixth Circuit Strikes Down Ohio Ban of Post- Viability and Dilation
and Extraction Abortions: Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 112 HARV. L. REV.
731, 736 (1999) (criticizing view that Ohio ban was unconstitutionally vague).
99. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 86, at 8 (Haskell monograph).
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has argued "[t]he location of a being-inside or outside the womb-
should not make that much difference to the wrongness of killing
it."' 3 Singer points out that "the fetus/baby is the same entity,
whether inside or outside the womb, with the same human features
(whether we can see them or not) and the same degree of awareness
and capability for feeling pain."' According to Singer, the only
possible justification for assigning significance to the fetus's location at
the time of death is something akin to good taste: "we are less
disturbed at the destruction of a fetus we have never seen than at the
death of a being we can all see, hear, and cuddle."'
05
The best answer to Posner and Singer is that regulation of the
locus of fetal demise is justified to preserve our sense of revulsion at
the destruction of a human being "we can all see." Revulsion at the
killing of something that is visibly human already is part of the moral
intuitions of most human beings, as was apparent from testimony at
congressional hearings on partial-birth abortion.0 6  Indeed, even
Judge Posner has acknowledged that the ability to see the fetus affects
our moral intuitions about the wrongness of killing it:
As we learn more about the fetus-as science makes the womb
more transparent to us-we are likely to feel a stronger empathy
for it, to see it more as a baby (that two-inch-long fetus is
recognizably human), to feel in short the tug of the analogy to
infanticide, and hence to rate the fetus's claims higher than when
it could be regarded as a formless lump of tissue.
1 7
Judge Posner also has acknowledged that the government may
have a legitimate interest in preserving "the moral repugnance that
most of us feel toward infanticide and euthanasia-more broadly, the
elimination of inconvenient persons."' 1 8 The deterioration of this fiber
of the social fabric would be dangerous, particularly since infanticide
already is very common, both in the United States and abroad.10 9
103. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 139 (2d ed. 1993).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 138.; See also Michael Tooley, In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY 209-33 (Pojman & Beckwith eds. 1998).
106. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 86, at 18.
107. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 290 (1992).
108. Id. at 288.
109. See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China:The Human Rights Specter and
Thoughts Toward (An)other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 249, 256, 256 n.26
(1991-92); Daniel Maier-Katkin & Robbin Ogle, A Rationale for Infanticide Laws, 1993
CRIM.L.REV. 903 (in Great Britain "the homicide rate among children under the age of one year
is greater than that of any other age group"); Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to
Terms with Modem American Infanticide, 34 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1996) ("an
extraordinarily high number of infants are killed within twenty-four hours of birth").
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The argument, in short, is that statutes governing where the
fetus is killed-that is, requiring the physician to kill the fetus in the
mother's womb, rather than on the operating table-advance the state's
powerful interest in inculcating in its citizens an aversion to the killing
of a human being "we can all see." Just as cruelty to animals has "a
tendency to dull humanitarian feelings and to corrupt the morals of
those who observe or have knowledge of those acts,"11° the killing of a
fetus in plain sight, where its resemblance to a human being is
unmistakable, has a tendency to dull feelings of revulsion that are
essential to human society."'
This is not to say, however, that laws prohibiting partial-birth
abortion would pass constitutional muster. Restrictions on partial-
birth abortion are constitutionally problematic for a number of
reasons, among them the fact that restrictions on the right to abortion
often are driven by discrimination against women."' Indeed, one of
the foregoing examples-laws prohibiting cruelty to animals-provides a
possible basis for an inference of discrimination. Laws prohibiting
cruelty to animals generally contain an exception for cruelty that
occurs during the course of scientific research or veterinary practice.
113
This exception suggests that legislatures are relatively unconcerned
about the impact on public morals of events that occur in a scientific
laboratory or a doctor's office. Thus, it could be argued that the
legislature's decision to concern itself with the moral import of what
happens in the office of the abortion practitioner is evidence of
discrimination against women.
My intent, in making this argument, is not to resolve the
question whether a well-drafted prohibition on partial-birth abortion
would survive a constitutional challenge. Rather, my intent is merely
to identify some situations where regulation might be justified in the
110. Knox v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 425 N.E.2d 393, 396
(Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (citation omitted).
111. In Evans v. Kelley, 977 F.Supp. 1283, 1319 n.38 (E.D. Mich. 1997), the district court
acknowledged the offensiveness and inhumanity of partial-birth abortion, though it struck down
the Michigan statute for lack of a culpable mental state. The district court in Evans explained:
In the court's view, the intact D&E procedure is gruesome and inhumane and society,
through its elected representatives, should be able to circumscribe its utility. Indeed,
even Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Doe, testified that the intact D&E is a particularly hideous
procedure. [5/5/97 Tr. 54-55.] ("This is a destructive surgery.... It's bloody, It's
destructive.... It is unpleasant." Id.) ... The court believes that the Michigan
Legislature may constitutionally regulate abortion practice in Michigan....
112. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 114; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. CAR. L. REV. 375, 382-83 (1985).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140, which prohibits cruelty to animals, contains exceptions
for conduct that "conform[s] to accepted veterinary or animal husbandry practice" and for
conduct that is "part of scientific research governed by accepted standards."
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name of protecting the social fabric. My concern here is with the
general validity of the argument from the social utility of moral
reaction patterns. Accordingly, I will next undertake a more detailed
analysis of the general form of the argument and its underpinnings.
VII.THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ARGUMENT IN ITS GENERAL
FORM
In its general form, the argument for the preservation of moral
reaction patterns rests primarily on three assumptions about why
ordinary people generally refrain from conduct injurious to others.
The first of these assumptions is that people generally do not calculate
the risk of apprehension and punishment before deciding, in a particular
instance, to refrain from committing a serious crime. This assumption is
justified in part by the fact that people who have no familiarity
whatever with the very complex statutes that govern assault, murder,
and sexual abuse generally have no difficulty in living up to the law's
expectations. The assumption also is borne out by our personal
experience. When a stranger talks during a movie, say, or cuts in line,
even the best of us sometimes will wish harm on him. But we do not
seriously consider taking up arms ourselves, nor would we even if we
could be certain of escaping punishment. People can quarrel about
whether it is "morality" that stops us or something else. What is
essential for purposes of this assumption is merely that what stops us-
whatever it may be-is not the criminal law itself.
Just as the ordinary person generally does not calculate the risk of
apprehension and punishment before deciding, in a particular
instance, to refrain from committing a serious crime, nor does she
generally calculate the short- and long-term social costs and benefits of
the crime. She does not attempt to calculate, for example, whether in
the long run the world might be a better place without the stranger
who talks during the movie or cuts in line. This is the second
assumption upon which the general argument depends: our everyday
decisions to refrain from conduct harmful to others generally are based not
on "critical moral thinking," but on simple, habitual patterns of
response.'14 Our experience as moviegoers and line-standers tells us
that we do not make these calculations. And common sense tells us
that we could not. As philosopher R.M. Hare has explained, the
"formation in ourselves of relatively simple reaction patterns" is "an
indispensable help in coping with the world.""'
114. The phrase "critical moral thinking" is drawn from R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING
44-47 (1981).
115. Id. at 36.
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In real life, we usually cannot foresee all the complexities of our
choices. It is simply not practical to try to calculate the
consequences, in advance, of every choice we make. Even if we
were to limit ourselves to the more significant choices, there
would be a danger that in many cases we would be calculating in
less than ideal circumstances.
16
From the fact that most potential crimes are prevented by these
"relatively simple reaction patterns"-rather than by the criminal law
itself or by critical moral thinking-we can infer that government has a
legitimate interest in preserving these reaction patterns in its
citizens." 7 Hare explains this point using the fiction of an all-knowing
"archangel," who is capable of perfect critical moral thinking:
If we wish to ensure the greatest possible conformity to what an
archangel would pronounce, we have to try to implant in
ourselves and in others whom we influence a set of dispositions,
motivations, intuitions, prima facie principles (call them what
we will) which will have this effect. We are on the whole more
likely to succeed in this way than by aiming to think like
archangels on occasions when we have neither the time nor the
capacity for it." 8
Though Hare himself seems to have in mind the "influence"
exerted by moral discourse, his insight also is relevant to government
policy. If the two foregoing assumptions are valid, then these
relatively simple moral reaction patterns-not the criminal law itself
and not critical moral thinking-are the fabric that binds society
together. Government must, therefore, be concerned with the effect of
its actions (or omissions) on these reaction patterns.
(Though I refer to these simple reaction patterns as "moral," this
terminology is mostly a matter of convenience. By the phrase "moral
reaction pattern," I mean only to isolate those reaction patterns that
tend to prevent harm to other persons and that, for that reason, are
socially useful. I do not mean to imply that the patterns must be
related to moral principles or must have their source in some moral
faculty. I assume, then, with Professor Jhos Andenaes, that
"[u]nconscious inhibitions against committing forbidden acts can also
be aroused without appealing to the individual's concepts of
morality.""' 9 Indeed, it seems likely to me that the aversion to incest,
116. SINGER, supra note 103, at 92-93.
117. HARE, supra note 114, at 36.
118. Id.at46-47.
119. Jhos Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality? 43 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 179 (1952) ("Unconscious inhibitions against committing
forbidden acts can also be aroused without appealing to the individual's concepts of morality.
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to which I already have referred as a moral reaction pattern, might be
perceived by many individuals as wholly unrelated to morality. 120)
How, then, is government to advance its interest in preserving
and cultivating moral reaction patterns in its citizens? The answer lies
in a third critical assumption: that the criminal law plays some role,
albeit a rather mysterious one, in the preservation and cultivation of these
moral reaction patterns. 121 The best evidence for this assumption lies in
its widespread impact on both the drafting of criminal codes and the
punishment of individual offenders. The Model Penal Code, for
example, is based in part on the assumption that the criminal law
prevents crime "by fortifying normal instincts to refrain from
injurious behavior. ' ' 122  In the courts, this assumption rises to the
surface when a severe sentence is justified by the need for
"reaffirmation of societal norms.' '123  The assumption is not a
thoughtless one: academics long have argued that the inculcation of
moral reaction patterns in the citizenry as a whole is among the most
important reasons for punishing serious criminals)24
Even if one accepts these three assumptions, however, the
question remains why the government would have an interest in
preserving or cultivating broad moral reaction patterns that, like the
aversion to incest, discourage even harmless activities. Would not the
public interest be equally served by the cultivation of slightly
narrower, slightly more complex reaction patterns that discourage only
harmful conduct? In the case of incest, for example, would not the
public interest be equally served by the cultivation of an aversion to
Purely as a matter of habit, with fear, respect for authority or social imitation as connecting links,
it is possible to induce favorable attitudes toward this or that action and unfavorable attitudes
toward another action.").
120. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 15 (1997).
121. This third assumption is not inconsistent with my first assumption. That is, there is
nothing inconsistent about assuming both (1) that we generally do not directly consider the law
itself before deciding whether to inflict harm on others; and (2) that the habitual reaction patterns
that do drive our conduct are shaped by our knowledge of cases where others have been
criminally punished.
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02, comt. at 21 (1985).
123. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970) (identifying as one of the
objectives of sentencing the "reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining
respect for the norms themselves").
124. See Andenaes, supra note 119, at 180 (among the criminal law's general preventative
effects is its tendency to "strengthen moral inhibitions" and to "stimulate habitual law-abiding
conduct." "To the lawmaker, the achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater value than
mere deterrence."); John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291,
291-92 (1998) ("It is the contention of this article that criminal law is the primary institution for
transmitting social ideology. ... Criminal law is society's synthesis of what is evil and taboo as
opposed to respectable ... Ultimately criminal law is the instrument by which the definitions of
social morality are woven.").
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sexual intercourse among fertile relatives, along with an aversion to
sexual imposition upon the young?
The answer is that it is unclear whether moral reaction patterns
are so easily manipulated. It is unclear, that is, whether the
introduction of new distinctions-designed to differentiate harmful
from harmless conduct-would make it more difficult for the narrower
principles to take root as habitual patterns of reaction. Again, incest
suggests itself as an example. It seems possible, if not probable, that
the introduction of new distinctions-between fertile and infertile
relatives, and between youthful and mature relatives-would weaken
the aversion to incest. In any event, it is difficult for us to imagine
that a person who felt no aversion whatever toward sexual intercourse
with an immediate relative who was over 21 and infertile would feel as
strongly averse as we do toward sexual intercourse with an immediate
relative who is fertile or is under 21. At the very least, one has to
concede that this person's reaction pattern would be fundamentally
different from our own. We are not, then, really talking about fine-
tuning the aversion to incest. We are talking about trying to replace
the existing aversion with a different one, which might or might not
take root as deeply.
This step in the argument does not require the adoption of any
particular theory of psychology or human nature. Rather, it requires
only an acknowledgment that the origins and persistence (and
occasional disappearance) of moral reaction patterns are, at present, a
matter of considerable uncertainty. And this acknowledgment cannot
be withheld. It cannot reasonably be denied that some rules take root
as reaction patterns and others-say, the rule that forbids sexual
imposition on teenage girls-mysteriously fail to take root. Nor can it
reasonably be denied that our society would be a different place-
perhaps better and perhaps much worse-if we really had the power to
implant reaction patterns at will. It is only a little bit less true today
than when Kant famously said it that the "moral law" within us is a
source of "wonder and awe. '1 25 It is a mystery why people are not
much worse than they are.
What is more, people really could be much worse. To anyone
who has worked in the criminal justice system, it is obvious that some
individuals inexplicably lack ordinary moral reaction patterns and that
these individuals can be very dangerous. Further, history teaches that
125. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 166 (Lewis White Beck
trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1956) ("Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above
me and the moral law within me.").
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the absence of critical moral reaction patterns can be characteristic of a
community as a whole, at least for periods of time. I am thinking
particularly of Nazi Germany and of recent events in Bosnia and
Rwanda (and of Primo Levi's warning: "It happened, therefore it can
happen again. ... It can happen, and it can happen everywhere." 2 ').
These and other examples demonstrate that there is something to fear
in the possibility that efforts to replace existing moral reaction patterns
with new, more enlightened moral reaction patterns might succeed
only in eliminating the existing patterns.
In its emphasis on uncertainty and on the fragility of the social
fabric, this argument resembles arguments for preservation of the
environment. Like many arguments for preservation of the
environment, this argument depends not on any affirmative prediction
of the consequences of a particular action, but on a conviction that the
consequences cannot be predicted with any certainty, together with a
sense of the gravity of any miscalculation. Philosopher Simon
Blackburn has nicely drawn out this analogy:
We have all learned to become sensitive to the physical
environment. We know that we depend upon it, that it is
fragile, and that we have the power to ruin it, thereby ruining
our own lives, or more probably those of our descendants.
Perhaps fewer of us are sensitive to what we might call the moral
or ethical environment. This is the surrounding climate of ideas
about how to live. It determines what we find acceptable or
unacceptable, admirable or contemptible. It determines our
conception of when things are going well and when they are
going badly. It determines our conception of what is due to us,
and what is due from us, as we relate to others. It shapes our
emotional responses, determining what is a cause of pride or
shame, or anger or gratitude, or what can be forgiven and what
cannot.' 27
This analogy is compelling. Nobody would deny, I hope, that
our continued survival depends as much on the "moral environment"
as on the physical one. As Professor H.L.A. Hart has said, "society
could not exist without a morality which mirrored and supplemented
the law's proscription of conduct injurious to others.' '128 Nor would
anyone familiar with human history deny that our "moral
environment" is fragile. Finally, no one can be confident about our
ability to reconstruct a new "moral environment" from scratch. From
126. PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 199 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Summit Books 1986).
127. SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD 1 (2001).
128. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 51 (1963).
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these premises, it makes sense to infer that, at least in some situations,
we should endeavor to preserve as best we can some of the moral
reaction patterns we already have.
But the argument for preservation of specific moral reaction
patterns also is different from arguments for preservation of the
physical environment, and these differences are both important and
illuminating. For one thing, arguments for the preservation of the
physical environment often are based not only on the instrumental
value of the physical environment to human beings-as a source of
human sustenance and shelter-but also on the intrinsic value of nature
itself. In this respect, the moral conservationist's argument differs
from the environmentalist's, as it must if it is to be consistent with
Ravin's major premise. In the Ravin calculus, a moral principle lacks
any intrinsic value. Thus, a law cannot be justified merely for the sake
of preserving morality qua morality. At most, Ravin permits us to
argue that the preservation of moral reaction patterns sometimes is
justified by the patterns' utility in preventing tangible harm to human
beings.
But the differences go deeper. Arguments for the preservation of
the physical environment often assume that every aspect of the
environment has instrumental value to human beings. And rightly so.
Because the physical environment really is a seamless web, any
substantial change in the environment has the potential eventually to
make the planet uninhabitable. Thus, the lowly snail darter is as
worthy of preservation as the panda, despite the fact that most human
beings derive little direct pleasure from its existence. In contrast,
arguments for preservation of the "moral environment" must assign
very different values to different elements of the existing moral
environment, for some of those elements are valuable, some are
valueless, and some have a negative value. Moreover, some ostensibly
"moral" reaction patterns are fundamentally (i.e., not situationally)
inconsistent with one another; thus, society cannot cultivate one
without damaging the other.
To illustrate, we plainly are better off for the elimination of many
ostensibly "moral" convictions about the place of women in society.
The continued cultivation of Victorian morality would have prevented
the flowering of the very valuable-and truly moral-conviction that
women should not be treated differently than men. Likewise, we
would be far better off without the ostensibly "moral" aversion to
other people's homosexuality. Granted, this aversion can coexist with
the conviction that homosexuals deserve, in theory, to enjoy the same
rights and privileges as heterosexuals. Thus, some judges have struck
Seattle University Law Review
down sodomy statutes as unconstitutional while simultaneously
expressing their personal aversion to sodomy.'29 But common sense
tells us that we would be better able to observe the moral imperative of
tolerance if the homosexuality of others were a matter of indifference
to us.
Further, even situational inconsistency among moral reaction
patterns would make it impossible for the "moral conservationist" to
maintain an attitude akin to the environmentalist's undiscriminating
reverence for nature. In the case of partial-birth abortion, for
example, our aversion to the destruction of creatures resembling
human beings comes directly into conflict with our sense of
compassion toward women who are unhappily pregnant. Abortion -
even partial-birth abortion-can be an act of profound caring toward a
person in great distress. 130  Thus, in deciding whether to permit or
forbid partial-birth abortion, we must choose between fostering an
aversion to the destruction of creatures resembling human beings and
fostering compassion toward people in distress. In this setting, we
cannot do both.
So I am not arguing that punishment can or should be used to
safeguard every aspect of this society's moral code as it exists at this
particular moment in history.13 1 I am not, that is, advancing a version
of "legal moralism."' 32 I am merely arguing that some existing human
reaction patterns have social utility and so are worth preserving.
Whether a particular reaction pattern can be described as "moral" is
not dispositive of the question whether it deserves protection, nor even
very helpful. Any particular moral principle must be assessed for
social utility, as Robert Wright has explained:
We should, in the end, dispense with those norms that don't
make practical sense, but in the meanwhile we should recognize
that norms often do make practical sense; they have grown out
of an informal give and take that, though never purely
democratic, is sometimes roughly pluralistic. What's more, this
implicit negotiation probably took into account some (perhaps
harsh) truths about human nature that may not at first be
129. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998) ("if we were called upon to pass
upon the propriety of the conduct herein involved, we would not condone it").
130. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 73 (RJ. Hollingdale trans.,
Penguin Books 1979) ("One has been a bad spectator of life if one has not also seen the hand that
in a considerate fashion-kills.").
131. See HART, supra note 128, at 72 (1963) (arguing against "[t]he use of legal
punishment to freeze into immobility the morality dominant at a particular time in a society's
existence").
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "legal moralism" as "[t]he
theory that a government or legal system may prohibit conduct that is considered immoral").
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apparent. We should look at moral axioms the way a prospector
looks at shiny rocks-with great respect and great suspicion, a
healthy ambivalence pending further, and urgent, inspection. 33
VIII.THE ARGUMENT'S ROLE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
Until now, I have focused primarily on the question whether
efforts to preserve existing moral reaction patterns sometimes make
sense as a matter of policy. But the viability of policy arguments for
"moral preservation" does not wholly answer the question whether
these arguments have a legitimate role to play in judicial review.
There are, in particular, two possible objections to relying on these
arguments as the basis for sustaining legislation on judicial review.
First, legislatures rarely, if ever, articulate utilitarian arguments for the
preservation of moral reaction patterns; instead, when confronted by
issues like partial-birth abortion, assisted suicide, and incest, they
typically advance arguments that appear to be naively moralistic.
Second, validating legislation on the basis of arguments for the
preservation of moral reaction patterns could be said to place the
courts in the position of colonial administrators who cultivate their
subjects' superstitions and taboos for the sake of keeping the subjects
under control. In my view, however, neither of these objections
ultimately is persuasive.
The first concern seems unlikely to trouble the courts. It is not
the usual practice of courts to require the legislature to explain the
basis for its enactments.' 34 And even those courts most inclined to
closely scrutinize legislation usually have not limited their review to
rationales articulated by the legislature itself.' In Isaakson v. Rickey,
133. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 362 (New York: Vintage, 1994). The
same point is made by Professor Smart: "We may consider whether it may not be better to throw
our weight on the side of the prevailing traditional morality, rather than on the side of trying to
improve it with the risk of weakening respect for morality altogether. Sometimes the answer to
this question will be 'yes', and sometimes 'no."' J.C.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of
Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 51 (1973).
134. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 594 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It
is not the usual practice of this Court to require Congress to explain why it has chosen to pursue
a certain policy.").
135. There are good reasons for this. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have
'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The
body as a whole, however, has only outcomes."); Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 46 (1972) ("The model asks that the Court assess the rationality of the means in terms of the
state's purposes, rather than hypothesizing conceivable justifications on its own initiative. But
identifying the purposes against which the means are to be measured is not a simple
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for example, the Alaska Supreme Court expressed its unwillingness to
validate questionable legislation on the basis of "imaginable facts."' 36
But the phrase "imaginable facts" was drawn from a law review article
by Professor Gunther,'37 who did not argue that "the only judicially
cognizable purpose [would] be one explicitly set forth in a statutory
preamble or the legislative history." '138 Gunther said, and the Alaska
Supreme Court evidently assumed, that a description of the
legislation's purpose by the state attorney general's office would be
sufficient to trigger deference by the courts. 139
Further, a legislator's expression of revulsion at, say, partial-birth
abortion or incest is not exactly beside the point. The argument for
preservation of a moral reaction pattern often will begin with evidence
that the activity to be prohibited actually does evoke a particular
reaction in a large number of people. Thus, a legislator who expresses
revulsion on behalf of her constituency takes a first, critical step
toward the conclusion that the legislation is justified to preserve an
existing reaction pattern. Moreover, the strength of the legislator's
avowed sense of revulsion could conceivably provide some indication
whether the activity to be prohibited really strikes at the core of an
important-i.e., socially useful-reaction pattern. Indeed, I suspect
that, in any particular case, even a judge's willingness to credit the
abstruse logic of the argument for moral conservation will be roughly
proportional to the strength of her own sense of revulsion at the
activity to be prohibited.
No real difficulty arises, then, from the gap between the naive
moralizing of legislators and the high-minded utilitarianism of the
courts. But what of the gap between the citizenry and the courts?
Does not the argument for moral preservation put the courts in
roughly the position of colonial administrators, who maintain order by
cultivating the natives' beliefs in primitive taboos? 4' The concern
here is that the process is undemocratic. Judges-so this
counterargument goes-would be required to uphold a statute for the
sake of instilling moral principles that the judges themselves do not
believe in. The citizens, meanwhile, would continue to support the
undertaking.... The obstacles to judicial inquiry into motivation are formidable here as
elsewhere.") (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
136. Isaakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976).
137. Gunther, supra note 135, at 20.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. ("A state court's or attorney general office's description of purpose should be
acceptable.").
140. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 138 (1973).
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statute only because they had effectively been duped by the courts into
believing in the moral principles that correspond to the law.
The argument for moral preservation does not, thankfully,
require judges to dupe the citizenry. The force of the comparison to
colonial administrators is derived in part on the erroneous assumption
that moral reaction patterns depend upon certain beliefs-say, about the
existence of immutable moral principles handed down by some divine
authority. But moral reaction patterns do not, or need not, depend on
such beliefs, for even the strictest utilitarian can believe in the efficacy
of inculcating simple reaction patterns in herself. Again, as Professor
Hare argued: "If we wish to ensure the greatest possible conformity to
what an archangel would pronounce, we have to try to implant in
ourselves and in others whom we influence a set of dispositions,
motivations, intuitions, prima facie principles (call them what we will)
which will have this effect.''. There need be no divide, then,
between the people who make the decision to inculcate the moral
reaction pattern and the people in whom the moral reaction pattern is
inculcated. They can be members of the same community, who, in
their communal wisdom, elect to inculcate certain reaction patterns in
themselves.
Experience bears out the assumption that human beings often
attempt to implant reaction patterns in themselves. Even the most
nihilistic lawyer will, if she has any hope of succeeding in her career,
attempt to inculcate in herself a powerful visceral aversion to lying in
court. Without this visceral aversion, she occasionally will be misled
by the perceived benefits of lying; she will miscalculate.' The
necessity of inculcating this reaction pattern in herself will become
forcefully apparent to any lawyer caught by a judge in a lie. But even
a lawyer who succeeds in deceiving a judge will, we hope, have a crisis
of conscience; she will be troubled and frightened by her very ability to
lie in court, and she will attempt, by inculcating a reaction pattern in
herself, to eliminate this ability. Likewise, a lawyer who learns that
she is perceived by judges as arrogant might try to cultivate an abiding
sense of humility. And a lawyer who drinks too much might try to
cultivate an aversion to alcohol.
Further, even if we suppose that some moral reaction patterns are
linked to beliefs about the world and even if we suppose further that
141. See HARE, supra note 114, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
142. SINGER, supra note 103, at 92-93. ("In real life, we usually cannot foresee all the
complexities of our choices. It is simply not practical to try to calculate the consequences, in
advance, of every choice we make. Even if we were to limit ourselves to the more significant
choices, there would be a danger that in many cases we would be calculating in less than ideal
circumstances.").
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nobody would try to inculcate in herself a belief she did not already
possess, 143 the utilitarian argument for the cultivation of moral reaction
patterns still need not create a divide between judges and the people
they govern. Ravin and its counterparts in other states do not assume
that judges lack non-utilitarian moral beliefs. Rather, these decisions
assume only that the judges' non-utilitarian moral beliefs are not a
legitimate basis for judicial decision. Indeed, in Ravin itself the
Alaska justices who joined the majority opinion expressed their
personal moral conviction that the use of marijuana is wrong.4 Thus,
in the unlikely event that a judge sustained a statute on the basis of a
utilitarian argument for the preservation of moral beliefs, the judge
would not necessarily be acting the part of a colonial administrator.
She might really share the belief to be preserved.145
Finally, the punishment of otherwise harmless conduct for the
sake of preserving broad moral reaction patterns is not so different
from the enforcement of broad general statutes in cases where they
work an apparent injustice. It has never been a ground for challenging
a statute that it yields irrational results in the case under consideration.
Substantive due process is satisfied when the general classification
scheme itself "is not arbitrary but instead based on some rational
policy.' 1 46  In other words, "[t]he test is not whether the statute, as
applied to the individual ... relates to a legitimate government
interest, but rather whether the classification created by the statute
which encompasses the [individual] is so related. ' 14 7 If we can accept
general statutes that sometimes require the punishment of harmless or
even superficially beneficial conduct, then there is no reason in
principle why we cannot accept general statutes that punish entire
categories of conduct that is harmless.
IX. CONCLUSION: RAVIN REDUX
The Alaska Supreme Court deserves praise for holding in Ravin
that "[t]he state cannot impose its own notions of morality, propriety,
or fashion on individuals when the public has no legitimate interest in
143. But cf. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR
PHILOSOPHY 1-31, 19 (1897) ("I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to
a man in this world").
144. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511-12.
145. See Williams, supra note 140, at 138 (discussing the "prospect of a society which is
utilitarian in government but less so in personal morality").
146. Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447,
452 (Alaska 1974).
147. Peed v. Cleland, 516 F.Supp. 469, 476 (D. Md. 1981). See also Briscoe v. Prince
George's County Health Dep't, 593 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Md. 1991).
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the affairs of those individuals.""14 The court deserves praise not least
because this holding is a "moral" one in the profoundest sense of the
word. A jurisprudence utterly divested of morality-a cold utilitarian
reckoning of costs and benefits-would assign weight indiscriminately
to every sort of pain and pleasure,'49 including the real pain many of us
suffer from perceiving the transgression by others of rules of "social
propriety," and including the real pleasure we derive from the
punishment of such transgression. In Ravin the court denied any
weight to these base pains and pleasures.50 In so doing, it made the
moral imperative of tolerance a polestar of Alaska's constitutional
jurisprudence.
But the acceptance of Ravin's major premise does not require us
to adopt too the court's seeming contempt for every virtue but
tolerance, as expressed in the court's equation of "morality" with
"propriety" and "fashion." The Ravin court's insistence upon harm
as a prerequisite to government regulation is entirely consistent with
its acknowledgment that harm can be inflicted indirectly, through
harm to "the fabric of society.""'i' And its acknowledgment that harm
can be inflicted indirectly provides a rationale for government action
that is designed to preserve existing moral reaction patterns. In some
cases, this rationale will be compelling. The social utility of the
existing aversion to incest-in preventing sexual imposition on family
members-probably justifies a broad statutory prohibition on incest,
given the relatively slight benefits to be derived from expanding
marginally the range of available sexual partners. Likewise, the social
utility of the aversion to shooting other people likely outweighs the
interest of gun owners in using human silhouettes for target practice.
The same rationale, finally, supplies the best explanation why
Ravin's central holding-that adults have a constitutional right to
smoke marijuana-has won no adherents among other courts. A
prohibition on the use of even "harmless" psychoactive drugs might
well be justified to preserve an existing aversion to what I will call, for
lack of a better term, diminished consciousness. The existence of this
general aversion can be inferred from Ravin itself, when the justices of
the Alaska Supreme Court expressed their personal convictions that
148. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509.
149. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 66 (1987) (identifying
"commitment to the subjectivity and arbitrariness of preferences" as one of the central articles of
faith of liberal individualism).
150. The same refusal to assign weight to these pains and pleasures is evident in the Alaska
courts' "principle of parsimony," which precludes a sentencing judge from imposing a sentence
whose length cannot be justified by the goals of sentencing, e.g. rehabilitation, deterrence, and
reaffirmation of societal norms. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985).
151. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509.
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psychoactive drugs impair our ability "to live responsibly, for our own
sakes and for society's." This conviction, however personal, has
very substantial social utility, for it would appear to be what chiefly
prevents us from using substances that, unlike marijuana, are harmful
both to the user and other individuals. By licensing the use of
marijuana, the Ravin court arguably contributed to the deterioration
of this moral reaction pattern.
152. Id. at 511-12. If scientific evidence for this proposition were necessary-it is not-it
could be found in a very recent study of Australian twins, which showed that early marijuana
users were up to five times more likely to move to harder drugs than were their twins. Michael
Lynskey, et al., Escalation of Drug Use in Early-Onset Cannabis Users vs. Co-twin Controls, 289
JAMA 427 (2003).
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